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In arguing for an "Anti-Oligarchy Constitution"' and a "Constitution
of Opportunity,"2 Joseph Fishkin and William Forbath face a recurring
problem: What does the Constitution have to do with their argument? They
emphasize that public officials have a duty to promote an inclusive and
broad-based middle class because this will help preserve democratic self-
government.3 But why is this a constitutional obligation?
The theory of living originalism4 can help articulate the constitutional
basis of their project. The purpose of this essay is to show how a
commitment to a republican political economy follows from the
constitutional text and from basic constitutional commitments to republican
government.
I. The Anti-Oligarchy Constitution as a Constitutional Construction
Arguments for constitutional political economy are examples of
constitutional construction. Constitutional constructions build out the
Constitution's basic framework where the text is silent, ambiguous, or
vague.5 Judicial constructions are the most familiar forms of construction,
but equally important are state-building constructions.6 Indeed, as I explain
in Living Originalism, most judicial constructions respond to state-building
constructions by the political branches.7  State-building constructions are
therefore the primary case, not the exceptional case, of constitutional
construction. Until well after the Civil War, the judiciary played a far
smaller role in constitutional construction than it does today.8 And even
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today, judicial constructions often respond to important state-building
constructions, as we can see in the debates over Obamacare.9
In state-building constructions, the political branches assert claims
about the Constitution's meaning; they flesh out the Constitution's
obligations and exercise the Constitution's powers of government through
the building of institutions that perform constitutional functions.'0
The Anti-Oligarchy Constitution is a constitutional construction. It is
an account of how best to make the Constitution work in practice. Fishkin
and Forbath argue that implementing the Anti-Oligarchy Constitution is
primarily a task of the political branches and only secondarily a task of the
judiciary." Along with a general statement of the Anti-Oligarchy
Constitution, they offer an interlocking set of principles and assumptions
about constitutional structure as a whole.'2
What is the ground of this construction? Constitutional constructions
must always be consistent with the basic framework.'3  The basic
framework includes the Constitution's text and its choice of legal norms-
rules, standards, principles, and silences.14  But the constitutional
framework also contains a small number of underlying principles that are
not directly stated but that we infer from constitutional text and structure.'5
What are those underlying principles? There are at least five:
(1) separation of powers; (2) checks and balances; (3) federalism; (4) the
rule of law; and (5) republicanism, or representative democracy.16  No
construction of the Constitution can be faithful if it rejects these principles
as part of the basic framework. Of course, because these are principles and
not rules, they may be articulated in many different ways and take many
9. Jack M. Balkin, The Court Affirms Our Social Contract, THE ATLANTIC (June 29, 2012),
http://www.theatlantic.com/national/archive/2012/06/the-court-affirms-our-social-contract/
259186/ [https://perma.cc/MJT5-7Q5S].
10. BALKIN, supra note 4, at 5; Jack M. Balkin, Constitutional Interpretation and Change in
the United States: The Official and the Unofficial, 14 JUS POLITICUM 9 (2015)
http://juspoliticum.com/uploads/5709fl5cf28c4-jpl4_balkin.pdf [https://perma.cc/C9CS-K8YP]
(describing a "dialectic of legitimation" featuring "a constant interaction between the
constructions created by state officials in the political branches of the government premised on
their claims about what the constitution permits or does not permit, and judicial constructions that
legitimate or partially legitimate or hold unconstitutional these state-building constructions").
11. FIsHKiN & FORBATH, supra note 1 (manuscript at 3-4) (advocating a return to an earlier
tradition of constitutional arguments that were "directed primarily to the political branches, and
only secondarily to the courts").
12. See id. (manuscript at 2) (offering a "structural constitutional argument[]" premised on the
idea that "economics and politics are inextricable, and that our constitutional order rests on and
presupposes a political-economic order").
13. BALKIN, supra note 4, at 21-22.
14. Id. at 36.
15. Id. at 14, 259.
16. Id. at 259.
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different forms. They do not determine the scope of their own extension,
and they must be balanced against other considerations. Nevertheless, it
would be unfaithful to the Constitution to argue that it does not contain a
principle of federalism, for example, or a principle of representative
democracy.
In fact, the principle of representative democracy is more than just an
unstated underlying principle. It is mentioned in the Constitution in
Article IV, Section Four, as a requirement that "The United States shall
guarantee to every state in this Union a Republican Form of
Government...."17
The Guarantee Clause seems only to assert that states must be
republican.'8 But it follows from constitutional structure that the federal
government must also be republican; a federal monarchy or oligarchy, for
example, would be inconsistent with the guarantee of republicanism in the
several states. Therefore, if the federal government must guarantee the
states a republican form of government, it must also guarantee them that it
will continue to be a republican form of government.
We should not consider the Guarantee Clause in isolation. The
principle of republicanism reaches into many different elements of the
Constitution, and the mere fact that this particular clause has been neglected
does not mean that republican principles and ideals are not at stake in many
other different clauses and parts of the Constitution. For example, the
requirement of regular elections, the bans on titles of nobility and bills of
attainder, the First Amendment's guarantees of speech, press, assembly, and
petition, and the Fourteenth Amendment's guarantee of equal protection of
the laws all speak to republican concerns.'9
Note that the guarantee of republican government is not simply a
suggestion. It is imposed as a positive duty on the United States. It falls on
all three branches. Each branch must fulfill that duty in the ways that are
most appropriate to its powers and institutional capacities. That means,
among other things, that courts fulfill this duty by deciding cases and
controversies, while the political branches fulfill the duty by passing laws
and taking executive actions.
The Constitution does not specify how the guarantee of republican
government should be carried out, except in the most extreme instance, as a
17. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 4.
18. Id.
19. U.S. CONST. art. I, §§ 2-3 (requiring regular elections for Congress); U.S. CONST. art. I,
§§ 9-10 (banning titles of nobility and bills of attainder); U.S. CONST. amend. I (guaranteeing
speech, press, assembly, and petition); U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 (guaranteeing equal
protection of the laws).
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duty to respond to insurrection or rebellion.20 This particular specification
makes perfect sense. Through their study of history, the framers were well
aware that republics could be destabilized and could be toppled by
antirepublican forces, leading to oligarchy or despotism.21 Thus, if an
armed rebellion overthrew the government of Texas and installed a
dictatorship or an oligarchy, the federal government would have a
constitutional duty to restore republican government in the state.
Otherwise, the Constitution does not specify when the duty to guarantee
republican government arises or how it is to be fulfilled. These questions
are left to the United States to decide.
To summarize: the Constitution imposes a duty-a guarantee of
republican government. This duty is consistent with the underlying
principle of representative democracy stated in constitutional text and
implicit in constitutional structure. The Constitution does not specify how
to fulfill this duty, leaving the question to all three branches of government,
consistent with their institutional roles.
An aside: in Luther v. Borden,22 Chief Justice Taney argued that the
guarantee of republican government was inherently political and therefore
was not justiciable.23 But the facts of Luther involved an insurrection in
Rhode Island that occurred between 1841 and 1842, seven years before the
case was finally decided in 1849.24 The question was whether the Court
would upset the President's determination of who was the lawful
government of the state.25 By the time the Court heard the case, order had
long been restored and it would have been absurd to second-guess the
President's decision and order the insurrectionist government-long since
26dissolved and scattered-restored to power.26 Chief Justice Taney's
language thus went much further than it needed to in order to decide the
case. For example, he also asserted that how states choose to organize their
20. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 4 ("The United States ... shall protect each ... [State] against
Invasion; and on Application of the Legislature, or of the Executive (when the Legislature cannot
be convened) against domestic Violence.").
21. See THE FEDERALIST No. 43, at 274 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961) ("In a
confederacy founded on republican principles, and composed of republican members, the
superintending government ought clearly to possess authority to defend the system against
aristocratic or monarchial innovations.").
22. 48 U.S. (7 How.) 1 (1849).
23. Id. at 42-43.
24. Id. at 2.
25. Id. at 44.
26. Michael A. Conron, Law, Politics, and Chief Justice Taney: A Reconsideration of the
Luther v. Borden Decision, 11 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 377, 380 (1967) ("These rival claims to power
and sovereignty comprised the 'political question' confronting Taney in Luther's appeal .... But
by then the issue was an academic one.").
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electoral systems is also a political question in which courts can play no
role.27 That dictum has long been cast aside.28
We cannot fairly read Luther to justify a general withdrawal of the
judiciary from enforcement of Article IV, Section Four. This would be
flatly inconsistent with the obligation of "The United States"-which
includes all three branches of government-to guarantee republican
government.
This point has only a minor effect on Fishkin and Forbath's project,
however, because they are primarily concerned with the duties of the
political branches and with what I call state-building constructions.29 But it
does suggest that the judiciary also has a role in securing republican
government, for example, in legitimating certain state-building
constructions and in protecting certain rights that are important to
republican government, like the rights to vote, hold office, and participate
in political life.
II. What Is Republican Government?
I have argued that Fishkin and Forbath's '"Anti-Oligarchy
Constitution" is a political construction of the requirement of republican
government, which is both a positive duty mentioned in the text of the
Constitution and an underlying principle of the Constitution. This
requirement asserts that the political branches of the federal government
have a constitutional duty to guarantee republican government. And
because the guarantee would mean nothing if the United States were not
republican, it also imposes a duty on the United States to maintain itself as a
republican form of government.
But what do we mean by republican government? Today people often
understand republicanism in contrast to pure or direct democracy.30 For
example, Randy Barnett's new book, Our Republican Constitution,
identifies republicanism with representative government that secures natural
rights.31 More interestingly and controversially, he identifies the
republicanism of the Founders with what is generally viewed as its
27. Luther, 48 U.S. at 46-47.
28. See, e.g., Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 577 (1964) (holding that state legislative
districts must be roughly equal in population).
29. FISHKIN & FORBATH, supra note 1, at 3-4 (arguing that the constitutional duty to prevent
oligarchy rests primarily with the political branches).
30. E.g., RANDY E. BARNETT, OUR REPUBLICAN CONSTITUTION: SECURING THE LIBERTY
AND SOVERIGNTY OF WE THE PEOPLE 18-19 (2016) (opposing "Republican" and "Democratic"
conceptions of the Constitution).
31. See id. at 23 ("A Republican Constitution views the natural and inalienable rights of these
joint and equal sovereign individuals as preceding the formation of governments.... The small
subset of individuals who are empowered to govern ... [are] the servants of the people.").
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complement or opposite-Lockean-inspired, natural-rights liberalism.32
But that is a subject for another essay.
The founding generation had a more capacious view of republics and
republicanism.34 We do not have to accept that view in all of its particulars,
any more than we have to accept the adopters' views about the scope of the
First Amendment or the Equal Protection Clause. Nevertheless, consistent
with the premises of a living originalism, we can investigate historical
understandings and historical articulations of principles to decide on the
constructions that are most faithful to the Constitution today. This activity
of historical reimagination attempts to keep faith with the Constitution as a
transgenerational political project. Far from abandoning constitutional
fidelity, historical investigation and reimagination seek the best way to
continue the American constitutional tradition in our own time.35
The Founders understood republicanism through an interlocking set of
* 36ideas and principles.
First, the Founders opposed republicanism not merely to direct popular
rule, but also to monarchy, aristocracy, and oligarchy. A republic is
therefore an antimonarchical, antiaristocratic, and anti-oligarchical form of
government.38
32. See id. at 63 ("The text of the Constitution expressly acknowledges the underlying
political theory of the Declaration, namely, its roots in the natural and inalienable right of
individuals-that is, that first come rights and then comes government.").
33. See Jack M. Balkin, Which Republican Constitution?, CONST. COMM. (forthcoming 2016)
(manuscript at 2, 11), http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstractid=2761513
[https://perma.cc/BRW4-CK2L] (arguing that Barnett's "republicanism" is actually a
"sympathetic restatement of nineteenth century. . . classical liberalism" and that his book neglects
the actual historical tradition of republicanism).
34. Id. (manuscript at 11, 14-15).
35. BALKIN, supra note 4, at 3-4, 268 (arguing that fidelity to the past requires historical
reimagination of our commitments from the standpoint of the present).
36. The description of republican themes in the next twelve paragraphs is drawn from Jack M.
Balkin, Which Republican Constitution?, supra note 33 (manuscript at 15-19).
37. E.g., RICHARD BEEMAN, PLAIN, HONEST MEN: THE MAKING OF THE AMERICAN
CONSTITUTION xi-xii (2009) (arguing that "the vast majority of the Founding Fathers" were
republicans because "they had rejected monarchy and hereditary rule and had embraced
unequivocally the idea of representative government" although they differed on the nature of
representation); id. at 122 (noting that at the time of the Founding, "republican" meant opposition
to "hereditary monarchy" and support for "some form of representative government," but not
"unmediated democracy"); Alan Gibson, Ancients, Moderns and Americans: The
Republicanism-Liberalism Debate Revisited, 21 HIST. POL. THOUGHT 261, 286-88 (2000) (noting
that the Framers rejected both pure democracy as well as social orders directed by official groups
or memberships, favoring instead an extended republic with representation as the crucial element).
38. See THE FEDERALIST No. 39, at 241 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961) ("It is
essential to [republican] government that it be derived from the great body of the society, not from
an inconsiderable proportion, or a favored class of it; otherwise a handful of tyrannical nobles,
exercising their oppressions by a delegation of their powers, might aspire to the rank of
republicans, and claim for their government he honorable title of republic."); THE FEDERALIST
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Second, republicanism implies the notion of a public interest. A
republic is a res publica, a public thing that citizens have a duty to further
and defend through their efforts in politics. 3 9 The notion of a public thing-
a republic-presumes that there is a common good or public interest that is
not identical with the private interest of any individual or group. People
may disagree about what the public interest is-indeed, in a democracy they
often do. But they should direct both their efforts and politics as a whole
toward the realization of the public interest and the promotion of the res
publica.40
Because republicanism is grounded on a notion of common good and
public interest, many republican rights include duties which are connected
to the defense of the republic and republican values.4 1 The right to keep and
bear arms is an example. A purely liberal conception of the right to keep
and bear arms is a right of individual self-defense.42  But a republican
conception of the right to keep and bear arms is a public duty of citizens to
take up arms and, if necessary, to give their lives, to defend the republic
against tyranny and corruption.43
Third, republicanism includes a principle of civic equality. Because
republicanism opposes monarchy, aristocracy, and oligarchy, all citizens are
equal as citizens and the state may not elevate some special class of
citizenry above the rest.4 4 This idea was finally enshrined in the text of our
Constitution during Reconstruction in the Thirteenth and Fourteenth
Amendments, but it is implicit in the concept of republican government.4 5
The prohibition against class and caste legislation, recognized in antebellum
No. 84, at 512 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961) (describing the Constitution's
ban on titles of nobility as "the cornerstone of republican government; for so long as they are
excluded, there can never be serious danger that the government will be any other than that of the
people"). See generally GORDON S. WOOD, THE RADICALISM OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION
(1991) (describing how republicanism sought to disestablish monarchy and aristocracy in politics
and culture).
39. Thomas Paine, The Rights ofMan: Being an Answer to Mr. Burke's Attack on the French
Revolution (1791), in COLLECTED WRITINGS 565 (Eric Foner ed., 1995) ("RES-PUBLICA, the
public affairs, or the public good; or literally translated, the public thing. .. refer[s] to what ought
to be the character and business of government.").
40. See GORDON S. WOOD, THE CREATION OF THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC, 1776-1787, at 55-
56 (1969).
41. GORDON S. WOOD, EMPIRE OF LIBERTY: A HISTORY OF THE EARLY REPUBLIC, 1789-
1815, at 7-8 (2009).
42. Sanford Levinson, The Embarrassing Second Amendment, 99 YALE L.J. 637, 645-46
(1989).
43. Id. at 649-51.
44. WOOD, supra note 41, at 8.
45. Melissa Saunders, Equal Protection, Class Legislation and Colorblindness, 96 MICH. L.
REV. 245, 254 (1997) (arguing that antebellum state courts believed that class legislation
"threatened true republican government and with it, personal liberty").
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state constitutional law as well as in the Fourteenth Amendment, follows
from the republican commitment to the equality of citizens.46
Fourth, republicanism also includes a principle against domination.
The republican conception of liberty includes formal freedom from
restraint, but it also involves a requirement of nondomination.48 Mere
freedom from restraint does not guarantee nondomination either in civil
society or in politics. 4 9 In republican ideology, people who are dominated
by others are not free but slaves.so Slavery is the condition of lack of
freedom and self-rule." The republican opposition of slavery to freedom is
political as well as economic.5 2 Chattel slavery is only a special case of
slavery. As Sandy Levinson and I have noted in our work on the
Thirteenth Amendment, the founding generation often spoke of the
condition of the colonists as slavery because the colonists had no
representation in Parliament.54  The colonists were not arguing that they
46. See, e.g., FISHKN & FORBATH, supra note 1 (manuscript at 25) (explaining that
Jacksonians made equal protection arguments "before the Equal Protection Clause" by relying on
"a constitutional principle ... protecting the 'many' against class legislation that privileged the
'few').
47. PHILIP PETTIT, REPUBLICANISM: A THEORY OF FREEDOM AND GOVERNMENT 6, 12
(1997) (arguing that the distinctively republican conception of freedom is nondomination). Pettit
is the most prominent defender of the classical tradition of republican liberty in contemporary
political philosophy.
48. Id. at 21 ("[T]he conception of freedom as non-domination, not the negative conception of
freedom as non-interference ... was embraced among writers in the republican tradition."); Philip
Pettit, Keeping Republican Freedom Simple, 30 POL. THEORY 339, 340 (2002) (defining
republican freedom as nondomination, not noninterference); see also Jack M. Balkin & Sanford
Levinson, The Dangerous Thirteenth Amendment, 112 COLUM. L. REv. 1459, 1497 (2012) (noting
"the founding generation's view of slavery as antirepublicanism and unjustified domination").
49. PETTIT, supra note 47, at 31 ("[T]here may be loss of [republican] liberty without any
actual interference .... ); see Balkin & Levinson, supra note 48, at 1475 ("If domination can
exist within markets and welfare states alike, and can be reproduced even in social systems that
promise formal equality, then domination will appear-and reappear constantly-in modem
societies.").
50. See, e.g., Balkin & Levinson, supra note 48, at 1484 ("The colonial vision that opposed
slavery to republican liberty held that slavery meant more than simply being free from compulsion
to labor by threats or physical coercion. Rather, the true marker of slavery was that slaves were
always potentially subject o domination and to the arbitrary will of another person.").
51. See, e.g., PETTIT, supra note 47, at 31-32 (arguing that republican liberty is premised on
the distinction between free citizens and those persons, like slaves, who are subject to the arbitrary
power of another).
52. Id. at 32-33, 71-72 (distinguishing political liberty from political slavery-dependence on
others); see Balkin & Levinson, supra note 48, at 1484 ("Algernon Sidney's Discourses
Concerning Government, which was highly influential in eighteenth-century America and which
especially influenced Thomas Jefferson, defined slavery as arbitrary government, in which people
could not make laws for themselves.").
53. Balkin & Levinson, supra note 48, at 1462-63.
54. Id. at 1462-63, 1481-88.
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were chattel slaves; rather they argued that hey lived under the domination
of a distant government.ss
Fifth, republicanism includes a commitment to self-rule. In order for
the people as a whole to be free, the government must respect their
freedom. But a mere grant of civil freedom at the sufferance of the state is
not enough because it can be taken away. Therefore, in order for people to
be their own masters, the government must respect the rights of the public
and it must be responsive to the public's views over time. Hence the
principle of nondomination not only guarantees personal liberty, it also
requires self-rule and a representative form of government.58
Sixth, republicanism includes an anticorruption principle. Corruption
is the central enemy of republics, and it is a feature of both individuals and
political systems.59 Corruption occurs when government officials lose their
devotion to the public good and are no longer responsive to and dependent
on public opinion. Then officials promote their private interest or the
private interest of some elite faction or oligarchy over the public interest
and the public good.o
55. Id. at 1463, 1481-85.
56. Akhil Reed Amar, The Central Meaning of Republican Government: Popular
Sovereignty, Majority Rule, and the Denominator Problem, 65 U. COLO. L. REV. 749, 759-60
(1994) (arguing that "[t]he central pillar of Republican Government ... is popular sovereignty"
and that the "deepest spirit of republicanism" is democratic self-rule).
57. See THE FEDERALIST NO. 37, at 227 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961) ("The
genius of Republican liberty seems to demand on one side not only that all power should be
derived from the people but that those entrusted with it should be kept in dependence on the
people . . . ."). The idea that the preservation of republican liberty requires popular control of
government is not central to the classical republicanism of Machiavelli but developed in the
eighteenth century with the rise of democracy. PETTIT, supra note 47, at 30-31. This is the
republicanism of the American Revolution and of the American Constitution. AKHEL REED
AMAR, AMERICA'S CONSTITUTION: A BIOGRAPHY 278-81 (2005) (describing how republicanism
was equated with popular sovereignty in late eighteenth-century thought).
58. See THE FEDERALIST NO. 39, at 241 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961) ("We
may define a republic to be, or at least may bestow that name on, a government which derives all
its powers directly or indirectly from the great body of the people, and is administered by persons
holding their offices during pleasure, for a limited period, or during good behavior.").
59. See J.G.A. POCOCK, THE MACHIAVELLIAN MOMENT: FLORENTINE POLITICAL THOUGHT
AND THE ATLANTIC REPUBLICAN TRADITION 527 (1975) ("Virtue can develop only in time, but is
always threatened with corruption by time."); WOOD, supra note 38, at 105 ("Precisely because
republics required civic virtue and disinterestedness among their citizens, they were very fragile
polities, extremely liable to corruption."); Zephyr Teachout, The Anti-Corruption Principle, 94
CORNELL L. REV. 341, 352 (2009) ("The Constitution was intended to provide structural
encouragements to keep the logic and language of society as a whole from becoming corrupt,
representing a technical and moral response to what they saw as a technical and moral problem.").
60. PETTIT, supra note 47, at 210 (explaining that in the republican tradition corruption occurs
when people "make their decisions by reference not to considerations of the common good but
rather to more sectional or private concerns").
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To maintain a viable republic, one must prevent the corruption of the
political process. However, the problem of corruption is ever-present.6 1 As
time goes on, people disregard the common good, strive for power, attempt
to preserve and extend their status, and in general, invent ever-new ways to
dominate each other.62 Therefore, in order to preserve a republic, citizens
must be eternally vigilant in discovering the emerging sources of corruption
within the political system and to nip them in the bud before they have a
chance to undermine republican government. The best way to guard against
corruption is to create institutions that will preserve and promote civic
virtue and cause individuals to work for the common good.
Seventh, as a result, republicanism includes a principle against
political self-entrenchment.6 Today's majority must not be able to
entrench itself so as to prevent the development of a future majority.65  If
61. WOOD, supra note 41, at 8 ("[R]eliance on the moral virtue of their citizens, on their
capacity for self-sacrifice and impartiality of judgment, was what made republican governments
historically so fragile.").
62. PETTIT, supra note 47, at 210-11 (arguing that the basic problem of republican
governance is to promote resilience and stability in the face of continual sources of temptation and
corruption).
63. Id. at 212 (noting that "however much it may have insisted on the importance of virtue,"
the republican tradition "has embraced the need ... for a regime of checks and balances"). The
founding generation also emphasized the development of institutions of learning to promote
republican virtue. WOOD, supra note 41, at 476-77. Dr. Benjamin Rush famously argued that
education should "convert men into republican machines ... to perform their parts properly in the
great machine of the government of the state." BENJAMIN RUSH, OF THE MODE OF EDUCATION
PROPER IN A REPUBLIC (1798), reprinted in THE SELECTED WRITINGS OF BENJAMIN RUSH 88, 92
(Dagobert D. Runes ed., 1947).
64. BALKIN, supra note 4, at 243 ("The principle of republican government prohibits political
incumbents and temporary majorities from trying to entrench themselves in power."); see also
Michael W. McConnell, The Redistricting Cases: Original Mistakes and Current Consequences,
24 HARv. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 103, 114-16 (2000) (arguing that the Republican Government
Clause is designed to prevent political self-entrenchment); Richard H. Pildes, Foreword: The
Constitutionalization of Democratic Politics, 118 HARv. L. REv. 29, 44-45 (2004) (arguing that
many different features of the Constitution are designed to prevent self-entrenchment).
65. Political self-entrenchment violates the republican principle of majority rule. See THE
FEDERALIST NO. 22, at 146 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961) ("[A] fundamental
maxim of republican government .. . requires that the sense of the majority should prevail."); THE
FEDERALIST No. 58, at 361 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961) (describing majority
rule as "the fundamental principle of free government"); Letter from James Madison to Thomas
Jefferson (Oct. 24, 1787), in 10 THE PAPERS OF JAMES MADISON: 27 MAY 1787-3 MARCH 1788,
at 205, 212 (Robert A. Rutland et al. eds., 1977) ("[T]he republican principle . . . refers the
ultimate decision to the will of the majority."); Thomas Jefferson, First Inaugural Address (Mar. 4,
1801), http://avalon.law.yale.edull9thcentury/jefmaul.asp [https://perma.cc/2MZT-XLBC]
("[Aibsolute acquiescence in the decisions of the majority [is] the vital principle of
republics .... ). In his Vices of the Political System, Madison argues that "[a]ccording to
Republican Theory, Right and power being both vested in the majority, are held to be
synonimous." JAMES MADISON, VICES OF THE POLITICAL SYSTEM OF THE UNITED STATES
(1787), reprinted in THE MIND OF THE FOUNDER 57, 59 (Marvin Meyers ed., rev. ed. 1981). But
if a minority uses superior force and property, "one third only may conquer the remaining two
thirds," and "[w]here slavery exists the republican Theory becomes still more fallacious." Id.
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constitutional structure allows self-entrenchment, the system will be
corrupted, and the people will cease to be their own rulers, violating basic
principles of republican self-government.
To sum up: republicanism includes seven principles: (1) opposition to
monarchy, aristocracy, and oligarchy; (2) duties to further the public good
and act for the public interest; (3) equality of citizenship with no special
classes, privileges, or disabilities that might create a new aristocracy;
(4) freedom as non-domination; (5) individual and political self-rule; (6) a
principle against corruption (including individual and systemic corruption);
and (7) a principle against political self-entrenchment.
III. Political Design and Political Economy
Classical versions of republicanism also emphasized the importance of
civic virtue.66 Civic virtue involves a desire to work for the common good
and to defend republican principles; it is important both for citizens and
officials alike. Nevertheless, urging and educating people to be virtuous is
unlikely to be sufficient to maintain a republic. People are always tempted
by self-interest and clannishness. Somebody is always strategizing new
ways to obtain power and privilege. Without good institutional design,
people and government officials repeatedly stray from republican values.
They attempt to cling to power, engage in various forms of political self-
entrenchment, gain special benefits and privileges for themselves (and their
allies), and seek to dominate others.
Without a set of background (legal and constitutional) arrangements,
the pursuit of the public interest is overwhelmed by the struggle of
individual and factional interests; individual and structural corruption enters
the system, and the government loses its republican character.
Hence, the key to keeping a republic running is good institutions,
practices, and laws. In the context of a constitution, this principle means
66. See PETTIT, supra note 47, at 20 (arguing that historically republicanism has been
characterized by "a regime of civic virtue, under which people are disposed to serve, and serve
honestly, in public office"); id. at 245 ("[R]epublican laws must be supported by habits of civic
virtue or good citizenship . . . if they are to have any chance of prospering."); id. at 280 ("The laws
that advance the aims of the republic, institutionalize its forms, and establish regulatory controls
need to be supported by republican civil norms-need to be supported by widespread civic virtue,
by widespread civility-if they are to have any chance of being effective . . . ."); cf James
Madison, Speech at Virginia Ratifyring Convention (June 20, 1788), in 11 THE PAPERS OF JAMES
MADISON 158, 163 (Robert A. Rutland et al. eds., 1977) ("But I go on this great republican
principle, that the people will have virtue and intelligence to select men of virtue and wisdom. Is
there no virtue among us? If there be not, we are in a wretched situation. No theoretical checks-
no form of government can render us secure. To suppose that any form of government will secure
liberty or happiness without any virtue in the people, is a chimerical idea.").
67. See PETrTT, supra note 47, at 210-12 (expounding the classic republican themes of the
potential corruptibility of human beings and the need for well-designed institutions to promote
civic virtue); cf THE FEDERALIST NO. 10, at 80 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961)
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that a republic requires both a good constitutional structure and a good set
of basic arrangements for politics, which will prevent domination, political
self-entrenchment, and corruption.
Political economy is a necessary part of this structure. Political
economy is not separate from constitutional design.68 The separation of the
economy from other structures of power, including politics, is a
comparatively recent idea in human history.69 What we call "the market" is
an invention of states, developed in early modernity.70
Preservation of republican governance among persons and within
political practices must be maintained through the design of institutions.
Early conceptions of republicanism assumed that free citizens could not be
economically dependent on others, because such economic dependence
would lead to loss of political freedom, domination, and corruption (by both
dominators and dominated).7 1
This concern about dependence pushed in two different directions. In
a conservative direction, it supported antidemocratic features of
("The inference to which we are brought is that the causes of faction cannot be removed and that
relief is only to be sought in the means of controlling its effects.").
68. See FISHKIN & FORBATH, supra note 1 (manuscript at 1) ("From the beginning of the
Republic through roughly the New Deal, Americans vividly understood that the guarantees of the
Constitution are intertwined with the structure of our economic life."); id. (manuscript at 2)
("[A]rguments about constitutional political economy begin from the premises that economics and
politics are inextricable, and that our constitutional order rests on and presupposes a political-
economic order.").
69. See ERNEST GELLNER, SPECTACLES AND PREDICAMENTS: ESSAYS IN SOCIAL THEORY
285 (1979) ("The really fundamental trait of classical capitalism is that it is a very special kind of
order in that the economic and the political seem to be separated, to a greater degree than in any
other historically known social form."); KARL POLANYI, THE GREAT TRANSFORMATION: THE
POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC ORIGINS OF OUR TIME 74 (1944) (describing the separation of social
life into economic and political spheres in modem capitalist societies).
70. See POLANYI, supra note 69, at 65 ("Deliberate action of the state in the fifteenth and
sixteenth centuries foisted the mercantile system on the fiercely protectionist towns and
principalities."); id. at 68-76 (describing the invention of modem market systems in modernity);
id. at 140 ("The road to the free market was opened and kept open by an enormous increase in
continuous, centrally organized and controlled interventionism."); id. at 141 ("While laissez-faire
economy was the product of deliberate State action, subsequent restrictions on laissez-faire started
in a spontaneous way. Laissez-faire was planned; planning was not."); see generally David Singh
Grewal, The Invention of the Economy (unpublished manuscript 2015) (explaining the emergence
of the modem market economy from the creation and policies of the modem state).
71. E.g., 2 REPUBLICANISM: A SHARED EUROPEAN HERITAGE: THE VALUES OF
REPUBLICANISM IN EARLY MODERN EUROPE 2 (Martin van Gelderen & Quentin Skinner, eds.,
2005) ("[T]he exponents of republicanism [argued] ... that slavery inevitably breeds slavishness;
that those condemned to a life of servitude will find themselves obliged to cultivate the habits of
servillity."); ERIC MACGILVRAY, THE INVENTION OF MARKET FREEDOM 189-90 (2011)
("[C]ontemporary republicans agree with their predecessors in thinking that our character is
fundamentally shaped by the social and political context in which we find ourselves, and that we
are only free insofar as we are able to shape that context in turn.. .. [T]he presence of arbitrary
power poses a threat to our freedom precisely because it has a corrupting effect on our
character.").
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republicanism, including limiting political life to heads of households who
ruled over women, slaves, and apprentices, as well as limiting suffrage or
the right to hold political office to owners of substantial property, who were
assumed to be economically independent.72 For this reason, many
historians have pointed out that the republican tradition could and did
produce very inegalitarian results by today's standards.73 But the argument
about dependence could be flipped and pushed in precisely the opposite
direction. If economic dependence prevents citizens from truly ruling
themselves, republicanism demanded that the state should work to facilitate
a political economy in which fewer people were dependent on others and
dominated by others.74  Facilitating self-rule also required expansion of
political freedom and suffrage so that fewer and fewer people were subject
to political slavery.75 Finally, it required that the rules of politics not be
rigged to allow small groups to entrench their political and economic
power.76 The antidependence concern, in other words, is consistent with
many different forms of social structure, depending on our other
assumptions.
IV. The Debate Over Political Economy in the Early American Republic
The American republic begins with a continuous debate over what
kind of political economy is necessary to maintain a viable republic.
72. See WOOD, supra note 41, at 8-9 ("Since owning property made this independence
possible, all the states [at the Founding] retained some kind of property qualification for voting or
for office holding."); Linda K. Kerber, Making Republicanism Useful, 97 YALE L.J. 1663, 1668
(1998) ("Patriarchy was comfortably compatible with classical republicanism: the head of the
family represented the family (and its servants and slaves) in its relationship to the state.").
73. See Kerber, supra note 72, at 1668-69 (noting republicanism's many inegalitarian
features); see also FISHKIN & FORBATH, supra note 1 (manuscript at 27) (observing that the
Jacksonian republican tradition "wedded white farmers' and workers' democratic aspirations to
the racist causes of southern slavery and Indian Removal .... Slaves' and women's productive
work was not merely excluded from the Jacksonians' generous conception of equality for the
nation's producers; racial and gender subordination were among the bases on which they rested
their vision of the white man's republican liberty and citizenly independence").
74. See Akhil Reed Amar, Forty Acres and a Mule: A Republican Theory of Minimal
Entitlements, 13 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 37, 38-40 (1990) (describing exclusionary and
inclusionary versions of republicanism, and identifying the inclusionary version with the early
Republican Party); Balkin, supra note 33, at 3 ("The egalitarian version of republicanism, by
contrast, has argued that government should work to dismantle hierarchies of domination and
dependence and that government should create conditions for a broad base of middle-class voters
who are financially independent and therefore could rule themselves."); see also David Casassas
& Jurgen De Wispelaere, Republicanism and the Political Economy of Democracy, 19 EUR. J.
Soc. THEORY 283, 295 (2016) ("[R]epublican freedom requires a significant level of economic
independence as a countermeasure against a capitalist economic sphere rife with domination.").
75. See supra note 59; FISHKIN & FORBATH, supra note 1 (manuscript at 49-50) (noting
arguments during Reconstruction that without the right to vote freedmen could not be protected
from domination).
76. See supra notes 72-73 and accompanying text.
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Fishkin and Forbath argue that the republican vision called for a broad
middle class of Americans who could be economically independent and
self-sustaining.7  And it also called for greater inclusion so that more and
more people would enjoy the blessings of republican liberty. 8 This makes
sense given the familiar republican concern that economic dependence
makes it impossible for citizens to be their own political masters.
The republican ideals of the American Revolution and the early federal
republic coexist with Lockean liberalism. Indeed, the republicanism of the
Founders has important differences from the classical republicanism of
Machiavelli and Harrington and is a distinctively American and pragmatic
blend of liberalism and republicanism.80  Moreover, the Founders'
republican vision became increasingly liberal in the nineteenth century,
eventually turning into the liberal pluralism of the twentieth century.8 '
Nevertheless, key republican ideals and principles remain in the
American political tradition, resurfacing in ever-new guises and adapting
themselves to changing economic and social conditions. The seven
principles identified above never go away; they simply reappear in new
forms, leading to new debates over how to preserve republican ideals in
changing conditions.
In the early Federal period, republicans identified oligarchy and
aristocracy with the customs and trappings of the British Empire.82
77. See FISHKIN & FORBATH, supra note 1 (manuscript at 1-2) ("[W]e cannot keep our
constitutional democracy--our 'republican form of government'-without constitutional restraints
against oligarchy and a political economy that sustains a broad middle class, wide open and broad
enough to accommodate everyone.").
78. See id. (manuscript at 4-7) (arguing that a "principle of inclusion" is central to the
"democracy of opportunity" tradition that underpins the United States's constitutional
democracy).
79. See WOOD, supra note 41, at 8 (explaining that he Founding generation "took for granted
that a society could not long remain republican if a tiny minority controlled most of the wealth and
the bulk of the population remained ependent servants or poor landless laborers").
80. See Balkin, supra note 33, at 14-15 ("Today most historians believe that the founding era
was a pragmatic mix of both republican and liberal themes and that this ideological mixture was
continually evolving throughout the Revolution and the early years of the republic."); Gibson,
supra note 37, at 261-62 (explaining that founding-era thought was a mix of republican and
liberal elements); Cass R. Sunstein, Beyond the Republican Revival, 97 YALE L.J. 1539, 1540-41
(1988) (arguing that the Founders were "liberal republicans").
81. See Balkin, supra note 33, at 15 ("Liberalism increasingly dominates as America moved
into the nineteenth century, but republican ideas-like belief in the public good, opposition to
oligarchy, and concerns about political corruption-have always remained in the American
political and constitutional tradition."); FISHKIN & FORBATH, supra note 1 (manuscript at 54-58)
(marking the shift to liberal ideals in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries).
82. See FISHKIN & FORBATH, supra note I (manuscript at 13) ("[T]he revolutionary
generation ... held it a constitutional essential for the new United States to avoid reproducing the
hierarchies, titles, and aristocratic forms of privilege and elitism that the colonists hoped to leave
behind."); see generally WOOD, supra note 38 (showing how the revolutionary generation sought
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Monarchical culture and all that came with it, it was believed, led to
corruption and undermined republican government.83
In Great Britain economic power was often connected to aristocratic
lineage and privilege. Large landholding estates served as a key connection
between the maintenance of aristocracy, political influence, and economic
power.84 For this reason, the Northwest Ordinance of 1787 was designed to
reduce, if not eliminate, the sources of such power.s It banned both slavery
and presumptive primogeniture in the new territories: "[T]he estates, both
of resident and nonresident proprietors in the said territory, dying intestate,
shall descend to, and be distributed among their children, and the
descendants of a deceased child . .. in equal parts .. ."86 This is an early
regulation of the most powerful form of property-and therefore political
influence-in the New World.
The ban on slavery prevented the growth of plantations with large
numbers of slaves that would drive down the price of free labor and prevent
the economic sustainability of independent, small farmers.8 7 But the
limitation on primogeniture was equally important. It also served
republican ideals by discouraging the concentration of land ownership (and
thus economic and political power) in hereditary successions.8 8 Finally, the
Northwest Ordinance also encouraged education asa method ofuplift. 89
to distinguish itself from the culture of monarchy, aristocracy, and hierarchy associated with the
British Empire).
83. See Teachout, supra note 59, at 349-50 ("The British monarch exercised influence over
the representatives, using wealth and patronage to curry favor and to undermine Britain's
constitutional government. Moreover, the public culture of Britain had become wealth seeking,
pandering, and self-serving, with a populace undeserving of the title of a republican citizenry.").
84. See Michael Rush, The Decline of the Nobility, in DEMOCRATIC REPRESENTATION IN
EUROPE: DIVERSITY, CHANGE, AND CONVERGENCE 29 (Maurizio Cotta & Heinrich Best eds.,
2008) ("Ownership of land and, moreover, control of those who worked on the land gave the
nobility immense economic power, but noble power and influence extended well beyond the
economic sphere, intertwining with the social and the political.").
85. See Matthew J. Festa, Property and Republicanism in the Northwest Ordinance, 45 ARIZ.
ST. L.J. 409, 439 (2013) ("Because the rule allow[ed] for the breaking up of landed estates by
equal distribution of land between descendants, it also promoted a more widespread distribution of
land."); id. at 440 ("The concern for property distribution in Section 2 of the Ordinance ...
reflected a desire to populate the new territories with a greater number of virtuous, freeholding
republican citizens.").
86. Northwest Ordinance of 1787, 1 Stat. 50, 51 (1789).
87. David Brion Davis, The Significance of Excluding Slavery from the Old Northwest in
1787, 84 IND. MAG. HIST. 75, 76-77, 79 (1988) (noting that the goal of the Northwest Ordinance
was to encourage poorer white settlers to settle the territory and establish self-government without
having to compete against "cheaper [and] more productive" slave labor).
88. See Festa, supra note 85, at 443, 458 ("[T]he Northwest Ordinance... was part of the
general move toward a more republican conception of property" because it encouraged a "wider
distribution of property").
Gordon Wood notes that "all the states in the decades following the Revolution abolished both
entail and primogeniture where they existed." WOOD, supra note 41, at 498. The justifications
2016] 1441
Texas Law Review
The Jacksonian Era brought increasing recognition that oligarchy and
aristocracy arise not merely from official titles of nobility (although there
was plenty of concern about this too) but from inequality of wealth and
opportunity.90 This shift in focus is a natural development. As the country
shed the cultural influence of the British Empire, and everyone gave lip
service to republican ideals of equal citizenship and disdain for aristocratic
privilege, it became clear that the greatest threat to republicanism came
from the developing political economy of the new country. It was
capitalists and financiers, not necessarily highborn, who threatened to create
a new aristocracy of wealth.91
Whigs and Jacksonians offered different diagnoses and solutions for
these problems.92 Whigs argued for expanding opportunities to become
owners of land and capital. They argued that being propertyless should be
only a temporary condition, as long as the government created appropriate
infrastructure and incentives for economic growth. Jacksonians, by
contrast, opposed special privileges and federal investments in
infrastructure as corrupting.
As we move through the twentieth century to the twenty-first, these
ideas of anti-oligarchy and anti-aristocracy remain, although they take new
forms. So too does the republican ideal that the government must be
responsive to the people, that it must act in the public interest rather than in
the private interests of elites, and that a current majority should be
forbidden from entrenching itself to maintain political power.
The key question for constitutional theory is how to translate these
ideas into new economic and political contexts that the founding generation
never dreamed of. In this we are assisted, but not constrained, by the views
were republican. As the North Carolina legislature explained in a 1784 statute, these ancient legal
doctrines worked "'only to raise the wealth and importance of particular families and individuals,
giving them an unequal and undue influence in a republic, and prove in manifold instances the
source of great contention and injustice."' Id. Reforming the laws governing the most important
source of wealth at the time-ownership of land-would "'tend to promote that equality of
property which is of the spirit and principle of a genuine republic."' Id.
89. 1 Stat. at 52 ("Religion, morality, and knowledge, being necessary to good government
and the happiness of mankind, schools and the means of education shall forever be encouraged.").
90. See FISHKIN & FORBATH, supra note 1 (manuscript at 25-26) (describing Jacksonian
opposition to laws that would create "inequalities of wealth and influence" and "enable an
emerging oligarchy-the 'moneyed aristocracy'-to amass economic and political power over the
'middling and lower classes').
91. See Andrew Jackson, Seventh Annual Message (Dec. 7, 1835), in 3 A COMPILATION OF
THE MESSAGES AND PAPERS OF THE PRESIDENTS: 1787-1897, at 164, 165 (James D. Richardson
ed., 1897) ("Lavish public disbursements and corporations with exclusive privileges would be ...
the means by whose silent and secret operation a control would be exercised by the few over the
political conduct of the many . .. Wherever this spirit has effected an alliance with political
power, tyranny and despotism have been the fruit.").
92. See FiSHKIN & FORBATH, supra note 1 (manuscript at 25-26, 28-29, 36) (describing the
contrasting programs of Jacksonians and Whigs).
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of later Americans, including the great social movements of Jacksonianism,
abolitionism, labor, civil rights, feminism (in both its first and second
waves), consumer rights, and gay rights.
Each generation has to decide for itself how to make sense of these
republican ideals. They may disagree among themselves about their
application and about who is being most faithful to them in the present. As
Fishkin and Forbath point out, the Jacksonians and Whigs had different
visions of how to honor the republican commitment to a broad-based
middle class that was economically self-dependent and therefore able to
promote the public interest.93 Whigs insisted that only a powerful federal
government could make the investments necessary to allow people to
become economically self-sufficient; Jacksonians argued that the power of
finance threatened a new aristocracy of wealth and political oligarchy.9 4
Ironically, however, the Jacksonian embrace of slavery brought its
own form of political corruption. The antislavery advocates who founded
the Republican Party argued that the "Slave Power"-often defended by
Jacksonian politicians-was the most dangerous form of oligarchy and
aristocracy and that it was inherently corrupting to the values of
republicanism.95 It is therefore no accident that the new party called itself
Republican. The reason was not because its members preferred
representative government to direct rule-it was because they wanted to
preserve republican ideals of self-rule, anti-oligarchy, and anticorruption.9 6
93. See id (manuscript at 29-30) (describing Jacksonians' and Whigs' contrasting visions of
political economy, in which Whigs were not "unduly troubled by growing inequality of wealth" as
long as there was an opportunity to rise in society, whereas Jacksonians "hewed to the old
republican precept that a rough 'equality in the actual condition' of the citizenry was essential to
republican constitutions").
94. Id. (manuscript at 28-29) (contrasting the Whigs' activist conception of national
government with the Jacksonians' defense of federalism, agrarianism, and decentralized
development).
95. See ERIC FONER, FREE SOIL, FREE LABOR, FREE MEN: THE IDEOLOGY OF THE
REPUBLICAN PARTY BEFORE THE CIVIL WAR 9-10 (reprt. ed. 1995) (explaining Republican
concerns that a "conspiratorial 'Slave Power' . . .had seized control of the federal government and
was attempting to pervert the Constitution for its own purposes"); HEATHER COX RICHARDSON,
To MAKE MEN FREE: A HISTORY OF THE REPUBLICAN PARTY 6-7 (2014) (noting that Founders
of the Republican Party feared that a small number of plantation owners, who owned almost all of
the wealth in the region through their control over land and slaves, would attempt to use their
economic and political power to impose a new oligarchy on Americans).
96. See FONER, supra note 95, at 40 (explaining Republicans' belief that the South had
undermined freedom and democratic values because of its "irrevocably fixed hierarchical" class
structure "dominated by an aristocracy of slaveholders").
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V. Ideological Drift and the Central Problem of Maintaining Republican
Government
The intimate connections between Jacksonian democracy-which
claimed to stand for republican values in the 1830s-and the Jacksonian
defense of the Slave Power is a key example of the problem of maintaining
a healthy republican form of government under continuously changing
circumstances. No assertion of republicanism in American history is pure;
each is compromised by its situation and by its political allies. Therefore, it
is often the case that both sides of a political dispute can invoke republican
ideals on their behalf and plausibly accuse the other side of undermining or
betraying those ideals.
Equally important, the opponents of oligarchy and aristocracy in one
generation are easily tempted and co-opted into becoming the defenders of
new forms of antirepublican arrangements in later years. This is an
example of what I have called "ideological drift."97
I noted earlier that time is the great enemy of republics, because as
time goes on and circumstances change, corruption finds ever-new ways of
entering the system, weakening the institutions and practices that ensure
republican government.98 The causes of corruption, however, are not
simply human frailty and fallenness. They also arise from social,
demographic, and technological changes. These alter the meanings and
practical effects of older social arrangements, offer ever-new opportunities
for attaining and entrenching power, and thus present ever-new problems
for maintaining self-rule. This means that republicanism, if it is to have a
coherent and enduring set of political commitments, cannot be identified
with a permanently fixed set of arrangements. Time and political
contestation continuously produce ideological drift, turning the republican
stalwarts of an earlier era into the defenders of self-entrenchment and
corruption in the next.
As we have seen, republicanism is deeply connected to political
economy. But political economy is always changing due to changes in
technology and culture, demographic shifts, political conflict, and war.
Therefore, a commitment to republicanism requires a perpetual reanalysis
of the political economy of a republic. Even if basic laws do not change
quickly, economic arrangements are always changing, and people are
always struggling with each other to turn existing legal arrangements to
their advantage. If we trace the development of American inequality in the
97. See generally J.M. Balkin, Ideological Drift and the Struggle Over Meaning, 25 CONN. L.
REv. 869, 870 (1993) (defining ideological drift as the changing valence of moral, political, and
theoretical arguments "over time as they are applied and understood repeatedly in new contexts
and situations").
98. See supra notes 59-63 and accompanying text.
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last fifty years, we will discover that it arises not only from changes in
economic conditions and technology, but also from determined efforts by
groups to change the tax code, administrative regulations, antitrust law,
labor law, and constitutional doctrine to entrench their economic and
political power.99
The questions in every generation are the same: Who are the new
aristocrats? Who are the new oligarchs? What is the source of their power
and what form does oligarchy take? How is structural corruption entering
the political system? People disagree about these questions today even as
Jacksonians and Whigs disagreed. Liberals think they know where the
sources of corruption arise. But the conservative base of the Republican
Party identifies oligarchy and aristocracy with well-educated secular elites,
especially on the left. They fear a cultural and educational oligarchy
dictating the terms of American life to them. Because the conservative base
of the Republican Party views the question this way, they have found
themselves in a coalition with business conservatives and national security
hawks. As we have seen in the past year, this coalition has become
increasingly unstable, as members of the base recognize that their own
coalition partners are part of the problem, not the solution.' 00
Because of ideological drift, older forms of anti-oligarchy rhetoric can
be captured by new aristocracies and oligarchies to defend their interests.
The Jacksonian ideas of opposition to class legislation and the antislavery
ideals of Free Labor were captured by Gilded Age conservatives in the late
nineteenth century and turned to the defense of bare-knuckled capitalism.'0 '
Ideological drift is always in operation because each generation adapts the
most successful ideas of past debates opportunistically and for its own
concerns and interests.102
This helps explain the ideological drift of the First Amendment.
Earlier in the twentieth century, it was used to defend labor unions, antiwar
99. FISHKIN & FORBATH, supra note 1 (manuscript at 69-71); JACOB S. HACKER & PAUL
PIERSON, WINNER-TAKE-ALL POLITICS: How WASHINGTON MADE THE RICH RICHER-AND
TURNED ITS BACK ON THE MIDDLE CLASS 99-101 (2010) (describing use of deregulation and tax
reform to politically entrench and further enrich a wealthy minority).
100. See David Frum, The Great Republican Revolt, ATLANTIC (Jan./Feb. 2016),
http://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2016/01/the-great-republican-revolt/419118/
[https://perma.cc/V8KA-J3HE] (discussing the growing instability of the contemporary
Republican Party coalition and its effects on the 2016 election).
101. Jack M. Balkin, Digital Speech and Democratic Culture: A Theory of Freedom of
Expression for the Information Society, 79 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1, 25-26 (2004) [hereinafter Balkin,
Digital Speech and Democratic Culture]; Jack M. Balkin, Some Realism About Pluralism: Legal
Realist Approaches to the First Amendment, 1990 DUKE L. REv. 375, 383-84 (1990) [hereinafter
Balkin, Some Realism About Pluralism]; Joseph Fishkin & William E. Forbath, The Great Society
and the Constitution of Opportunity, 62 DRAKE L. REv. 1017, 1029 (2014).
102. See, e.g., Balkin, supra note 97, at 871 (describing the "gradual and partial reversal" of
conservative and liberal positions on the libertarian conception of free speech).
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activists, and advocates of contraception and women's equality.0 3  But
once the First Amendment become central to the pantheon of civil liberties,
it was also possible to adapt it to new ends.'04 By the early twenty-first
century, the First Amendment has become the most powerful antiregulatory
tool in the information age, especially in a world in which information and
information goods are central to markets.0 5
Fishkin and Forbath tell the story of change and co-optation of
Jacksonian and free-labor ideals during the late-nineteenth century.10 6
Republican progressives like Theodore Roosevelt understood that a
powerful national state was necessary to protect republican ideals in the age
of huge corporations and trusts.10 7  The New Dealers, led by Franklin
Roosevelt, argued against economic royalism, and for the promotion of a
more just conception of economic liberty as nondomination. To this end
they advocated collective bargaining rights, investments in infrastructure,
and the beginnings of the modem conception of social insurance.'0o In this
way, the New Dealers borrowed ideas from both the Jacksonians and the
Whigs of the antebellum period.'09
This constant borrowing and reconfiguration of constitutional themes
is necessary in order to deal with changing circumstances. And it is crucial
to the survival of republicanism. Because people's actions within an
economic and political system are constantly changing, and because the
effects of existing laws change over time, the problem of oligarchy and
aristocracy is constantly mutating. So too is the problem of maintaining
republican government.
103. Balkin, Some Realism About Pluralism, supra note 101, at 383-84 (noting "the historical
connections between left politics and free speech" in the United States).
104. Id. at 384 ("Business interests and other conservative groups are finding that arguments
for property rights and the social status quo can more and more easily be rephrased in the
language of the first amendment by using the very same absolutist forms of argument offered by
the left in previous generations."); id. at 392 ("[A]s liberals in the 1930s and 1940s gained power,
they. . . replaced the previous era's faith in an abstract concept of economic freedom with a
pluralist faith in an abstract concept of expressive freedom.").
105. Balkin, Digital Speech and Democratic Culture, supra note 101, at 25-27.
106. FISHKIN & FORBATH, supra note 1 (manuscript at 54-55).
107. Theodore Roosevelt, Address at Providence, R.I. (Aug. 23, 1902), in ADDRESSES AND
PRESIDENTIAL MESSAGES OF THEODORE ROOSEVELT 1902-1904, at 11, 15-16 (1904) ("The
great corporations which we have grown to speak of rather loosely as trusts are the creatures of the
State, and the State not only has the right to control them, but it is in duty bound to control
them .... ").
108. FISHKIN & FORBATH, supra note I (manuscript at 58-60).
109. Id. (comparing Roosevelt's political program to the ideas of both the Jacksonians and the
Whigs).
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